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Risk reporting: A review of  the literature and implications for future research 
 
Abstract:   
This paper provides a wide-ranging and up-to-date (1997-2016) review of  the archival empirical 
risk-reporting literature. The reviewed papers are classified into two principal themes: the 
incentives for and/or informativeness of  risk reporting. Our review demonstrates areas of  
significant divergence in the literature specifically: mandatory versus voluntary risk reporting, 
manual versus automated content analysis, within-country versus cross-country variations in risk 
reporting, and risk reporting in financial versus non-financial firms. Our paper identifies a 
number of  issues which require further research. In particular we draw attention to two: first, a 
lack of  clarity and consistency around the conceptualization of  risk; and second, the potential 
costs and benefits of  standard-setters’ involvement.   
  
JEL Classifications: D82 ; G14 ; G18 ; M41 ; M42  
Keywords: Risk-reporting incentives and informativeness; mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting; manual and automated content analysis 
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1. Introduction  
A substantial body of  risk-reporting regulations (e.g., ICAEW, 1997, 2011; SEC, 1997, 2010) has 
emerged demanding greater quantity and quality in firms’ risk reporting. A series of  accounting 
scandals and the recent financial crisis have emphasized the importance of  this topic. Hence, 
there has been a great deal of  scrutiny of  firms’ risk-reporting practices (e.g., Pérignon & Smith, 
2010; Singleton‐Green, 2012). Various groups of  stakeholders have urged regulators to act to 
ensure that users of  financial statements are protected from material levels of  information 
asymmetry (Bamber & McMeeking, 2015). The complexities and controversiality of  regulating 
risk-reporting practices, as well as the regulations themselves, have played a major role in the 
emergence of  a large and growing risk-reporting literature. 
This study collates and critically discusses the recent risk-reporting research, highlights 
trends and patterns, and suggests opportunities for future research. The following aspects of  this 
article are noteworthy: it focuses on archival empirical studies of  external risk reporting; it is a 
wide-ranging review of  recent literature (1997-2016); and it complements and extends previous 
reviews (i.e., Ryan, 1997, 2012a).  
Our review considers literature that deals with external risk reporting as part of  a firm’s 
disclosure strategy, which we organize around two themes: (i) the underlying drivers and 
determinants (the main incentives) that motivate firms to provide risk information; and (ii) 
whether externally reported risk information is informative, by observing its impact on market 
indicators (e.g., the stock price, investor-perceived risk, market liquidity). This focus allows us to 
build on the recent trend in the literature for examining the narrative sections of  firms’ annual 
reports (for a review see, Beattie, 2014). The study of  risk reporting has been facilitated by the 
availability of  machine-readable data and the increased(-ing) sophistication of  automated content 
analysis software, methodologies, and techniques (for a review see, Li, 2010; Loughran & 
McDonald, 2016). Thus, our paper also supplements these recent reviews of  narrative 
disclosures and content analysis with a practical focus on risk reporting.  
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Our article provides a wide-ranging review of  the recent literature. We cover papers 
published between 1997, the year of  the last published similarly wide-ranging survey of  Ryan 
(1997), and 2016 that have appeared in an internationally recognized peer-reviewed journal. We 
define such journals according to the UK’s Association of  Business Schools (ABS) journal 
quality ranking guide (i.e., those termed 3 star and 4 star journals), the Australian Business 
Deans’ Council, ABDC, (i.e., those termed A or A star journals), or the Financial Times 50 
journals (FT50), which are compiled based on the Business School research rank in America and 
Canada. We review 32 papers. Table 1 provides details of  these, categorizing each according to 
their primary theme (i.e., incentives, informativeness, or both).  
 [Insert Table 1 about here]  
Our article complements Ryan (1997) and extends Ryan (2012a). Our survey reviews work 
on risk disclosure that has been published after Ryan (1997) and synthesizes its principal themes 
into incentives for risk disclosure and/or informativeness of  risk information. Ryan (1997) 
concludes that disclosure guidelines should concentrate on providing useful decision-making 
information to help investors identify sources of  risk. This information should enable investors 
to determine both the ex-ante exposure to risk and the ex post realization of  risk. Ryan (2012a) 
focuses mostly on the potential opportunities offered by risk information and concludes that 
firms do not appear to estimate – and auditors, analysts, and others do not appear to evaluate – 
fair values with as much effort if  these values are disclosed rather than recognized.  
Our review differs significantly from Ryan’s (2012a) highly-selective and primarily policy-
oriented risk-reporting survey. For example, our paper discusses the distinctions between, and 
implications of, research on (i) mandatory versus voluntary disclosures, emphasizing differences 
between the incentives for, and informativeness of, risk reporting; (ii) quantitative versus 
qualitative disclosures; and (iii) risk reporting in the US versus international settings.  
Our paper makes three important contributions to knowledge. First, we provide an up-to-
date review of  the recent risk-reporting literature. We identify existing gaps and provide 
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suggestions as to how future research might fill them. Second, this paper exposes the significant 
areas of  divergence in the literature in relation to key risk-reporting themes. Highlighting and 
discussing these areas provides the opportunity to offer suggestions for future research, 
collaboration, and reconciliation, particularly across countries. Finally, given that the international 
standard-setters are reassessing their stance on disclosure requirements while at the same time 
developing a risk-reporting framework, our study provides guidance on the various differences 
between risk-reporting approaches. Specifically, our paper identifies important areas of  
divergence between the US-based and EU/Australasian (AUS)-based research on risk reporting 
and, in so doing, establishes a wider understanding of  the debate on international convergence. 
These areas include the following: (i) the majority of  EU/AUS research focuses on why firms 
might reveal risk information while the majority of  US research is concerned with how the 
market reacts to risk information that is principally provided under Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requirements; (ii) US-based research predominantly focuses on mandatory 
disclosure while the EU/AUS work considers voluntary, quasi-voluntary or quasi-mandatory, and 
mandatory disclosure; and (iii) the methodological approach varies with EU/AUS-based research 
generally employing manual data collection and analysis, and focusing on shorter time periods 
(normally one year), while recent US-based research shows a preference towards computerized 
content analysis approaches that allow the gathering of  extensive datasets over longer time 
periods. Figure 1 summarizes the criteria for paper selection, identifies the main themes, and 
provides details of  those divergent features.  
    [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
This paper proceeds as follows: Sections 2, 3 and 4 critique the recent archival empirical 
research on the incentives for, and informativeness of, risk reporting. Section 5 identifies the key 
areas of  divergence between these studies, draws conclusions, and proposes a number of  
avenues for future research.   
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2. Empirical research on the incentives for risk reporting 
This section discusses studies that examine why firms reveal different quantities and qualities of  
risk information. Three main methodological approaches have been adopted to address the 
‘incentives’ question. The most common is that of  manual and/or automated content analysis 
using either number of  sentences or words, or both. Among the 16 studies that focus on 
incentives, five adopt a manual approach, and three utilize an automated approach. Six studies 
adopt some form of  disclosure index and two use questionnaires. Given that the two 
questionnaire-based studies preceded the others, we begin our discussion there. We then proceed 
to the content analysis studies, leading to those that specifically employed disclosure indices.  
Additional related details are provided in Table 2 (jurisdiction, sample, findings, theory, and 
limitations). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
2.1 Questionnaires 
We identified two studies utilizing a questionnaire approach. Solomon (1999) surveys 40 UK-
based institutional investors to investigate the extent to which UK investment institutions are 
likely to adopt a single (managing the foreign exchange risk of  their own portfolios) or a dual 
(also encouraging their investee firms to engage in a hedging relationship) strategy to reduce 
expected losses related to foreign exchange risk. She finds an increased awareness of  the 
importance of  managing foreign exchange risk. Institutional investors are likely to pay attention 
not only to their own portfolios but also to those of  their investee firms. She also finds that UK 
institutional investors demanded more information on how firms manage their risks than 
currently was being disclosed.  
Based on 97 questionnaires, Solomon et al. (2000) find UK institutional investors generally 
do not favor a regulated corporate risk disclosure environment or a general statement of  
business risk. Respondents indicated that risk disclosures were informative in relation to their 
portfolio investment decisions but were neutral in attitude towards other aspects. The variations 
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in attitudes towards risk disclosures among UK institutional investors seem to be driven by the 
type of  fund managed and their investment horizons. Solomon et al. (2000) also develop a 
framework portraying how various stages (e.g., identification, estimation and disclosure of  risk) 
are required to achieve better reporting of  firms’ riskiness. Concentrating on the reporting of  
information about firms’ riskiness, they find UK institutional investors rely on corporate reports 
as a key source of  risk information, preferring the voluntary format.  
In this first group, the two studies emphasize some important aspects which are repeated 
in the next two groups of  studies. They claim that risk information in annual reports is useful 
and that mandatory requirements can encourage additional discretionary risk reporting.  
2.2 Content analysis 
The second group uses manual or automated content analysis. First, we examine those using the 
manual approach. One of  the most influential, arguably, is Beretta and Bozzolan (2004). Shevlin 
(2004) claims their work signifies a step forward in the construction of  a measure suitable for 
voluntary disclosure research. They propose a framework, comprising four dimensions, to 
analyze firms’ risk disclosures, namely: quantity, density, depth, and outlook profile.1 They argue that 
attention must be paid not only to the volume of  disclosure but also to the questions of  what is 
disclosed and how. They find that the quantity of  risk disclosure for their sample of Italian firms 
is mainly driven by firm size as opposed to industry type. Interestingly, however, the results for 
the overall quality of  risk disclosure suggest that neither size nor industry dominates the 
managerial risk disclosure decision, but rather the influence of  these two factors varies across the 
four dimensions. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004: 265) conclude with the claim that their proposed 
synthetic measure of  risk reporting “can be used to rank the quality of  the disclosure of  risks.” 
                                                          
1 The definitions of  these dimensions are interesting. Rather than being ‘as is’, the raw quantity of  disclosure 
(number of  risk-reporting related phrases in the Management Discussion and Analysis [MD&A]) is adjusted for two 
external factors to create a relative measure: (i) industry, and (ii) size. Density is defined as the ratio between the 
number of  sentences in which risk information is provided over the total number of  sentences included in the 
MD&A. In their framework, depth is defined by two properties: (i) the sign of  the economic impact (i.e., positive, 
negative, equal, or not disclosed) of  the risk-related disclosure; and (ii) the measures used to communicate the 
expected performance. Outlook profile refers to how management communicate the approach adopted to face the 
risks identified, thus distinguishing between those who simply identify risks and those who provide information 
about how management intend to mitigate them (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004: pp. 271-275). 
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Although Beretta and Bozzolan’s (2004) study has been influential, Shevlin (2004) and 
Botosan (2004) assert that it is difficult to apply the proposed methodology as it requires an 
intensive manual data collection period and involves substantial subjectivity in its application. 
Shevlin (2004) also raises questions about the gap between the dimensions of  the proposed 
framework and their underlying theoretical development. Despite this, he proposes two areas of  
extension: First, developing and testing predictions about the cross-sectional variation in the 
synthetic risk disclosure measure developed by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004; described above) 
would help to explain firms’ choices over the voluntary risk disclosure level. Second, examining 
whether this measure is associated with firms’ equity and debt cost of  capital would shed light on  
usefulness – in a conventional economic sense – of  risk information. In her discussion of  
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Botosan (2004) provides an alternative method for measuring the 
quality of  a firm’s risk disclosure. She draws on the definition of  quality of  information from the 
extant International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) conceptual framework i.e., quality is a 
function of  relevance, reliability, understandability and comparability.  
Also addressing this issue of  the quantity and quality of  risk reporting, Miihkinen (2012) 
investigates the impact of  the implementation of  a detailed Finnish risk-reporting standard on 
firms’ overall risk disclosure. To obtain quantity and quality scores, he uses manual content 
analysis based on both the number of  words and sentences (see Table 2, content analysis [code 
unit]) a firm discloses in its annual report’s risk review section. Quality scores are calculated using 
the principal component of  three proxies, namely: quantity of  disclosure (number of  words), coverage 
of  disclosure (concentration of  disclosure topic among five types), and the semantic properties of  the 
disclosure (contains two dimensions, depth and outlook, the former looking at both quantitative and 
qualitative effects of  risk disclosure, the latter looking at action taken and/or programs planned 
to reduce risk). He finds that both quantity and quality increase as a result of  the implementation 
of  this new Finnish standard; although it should be noted that the level of  quantitative disclosure 
was not found to increase significantly which could mean that this more comprehensive 
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information is symbolic in nature, rather than substantive. This conclusion is consistent with 
Abraham and Shrives’ (2014) findings, albeit in a different jurisdiction (i.e., the UK). Miihkinen’s 
(2012) findings indicate that the quality of  risk disclosure is associated with size, profitability, 
listing status, risk, growth, and foreign ownership. In further analyses, he finds that the observed 
impact of  the risk standard, and other incentives, are more pronounced among loss-making 
firms, and that poorly-performing firms are likely to face more pressure from investors to 
provide high-quality risk information as a response to their business risk.  
Another study adopting manual content analysis is the frequently cited Linsley and Shrives 
(2006). It seeks to identify the main drivers of  the quantity of  aggregate risk disclosure by 
classifying each sentence into the following categories: financial/non-financial, monetary/non-
monetary, good news/bad news, and forward-looking/historic. The findings show that firm size, 
and to a lesser extent environmental risk are statistically associated with risk disclosure, whereas 
gearing, asset cover, and other measures of  risk (i.e., beta and the book-to-market value of  
equity) are not. Abraham and Cox (2007) adopt a similar approach – manual content analysis – 
to investigate the impact of  corporate governance factors on risk disclosure. They identify and 
subsequently classify risk disclosure sentences into one of  the following four categories of  risk: 
total, business, financial, and internal control. Following this, they count the number of  words 
within each sentence. They also consider the location of  the risk disclosure within the annual 
report. This is potentially an important issue, as the location of  risk disclosure can detract from 
its usefulness (Ryan, 2012a). Using data from a UK context, they find that the number of  
executive directors and the number of  independent non-executive directors is significantly 
positively related to higher levels of  aggregated risk reporting. Other factors which are also 
positively and significantly related include lower institutional ownership and dual-listing 
(UK/US). These results are consistent across three of  the four categories, namely: total, 
business, and financial. However, the results related to the levels of  internal control risk 
reporting are mixed. 
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Lastly in this series of  papers adopting a manual approach, Ntim et al. (2013) examine the 
effect of  corporate governance on the quality and extent of  risk disclosure in South African 
companies. In this case, they count risk-related sentences and employ a self-developed 50-item 
index to measure the quality of  this disclosure. They find risk disclosure to be largely non-
financial, historical, qualitative (non-monetary) in nature, and consisting of  good news. They also 
find corporate risk disclosure is negatively related to block ownership and institutional ownership 
and positively related to board diversity, board size, and the number of  independent non-
executive directors.  
Recently, accounting research has shifted towards automated approaches for content 
analysis, and to this end, our review identifies three papers employing this approach in the field 
of  risk reporting. Elshandidy et al. (2013) investigate the impact of  corporate risk levels on 
aggregated, voluntary, and mandatory risk disclosure in annual report narratives. Utilizing a list 
of  risk-related words (e.g., risk, shortage, threat, and uncertain), they produce aggregated risk 
scores. Selecting words to be included in lists, such as this, is a non-trivial endeavor. To help 
mitigate this problem, Elshandidy et al. (2013: 324) draw on three sources of  information: prior 
academic and professional research on risk concepts, Roget's Thesaurus, and other words 
indicative of  risk, identified by reviewing the annual report narratives. They identify mandatory 
risk scores by developing a list of  six themes or topics that reflect the mandatory requirements 
of  the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the IASB. These are: contingencies, segment 
reporting, foreign exchange transactions, substance of  transactions or investments, related-party 
disclosures, and derivatives. They subtract the mandatory risk score from the aggregate risk 
scores to obtain voluntary risk scores. They note that while the aggregated risk scores are 
consistent with the voluntary risk scores in relation to risk levels, those scores, however, are 
inconsistent with the mandatory scores in relation to risk levels. This suggests that each 
disclosure type (i.e., mandatory and voluntary) has a different set of  drivers. After discriminating 
between high- and low-risk firms based on their betas, they find that high-risk firms are more 
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likely to disclose both mandatory and voluntary risk information in response to their corporate 
risk levels. 
Adopting a similar approach but on a larger scale, Elshandidy et al. (2015) explore whether, 
and if  so to what extent, firm and country characteristics influence variations in mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. They draw on data from non-financial firms across three countries. This 
jurisdictional analysis shows that UK and German firms tend to use voluntary risk reporting to 
complement mandatory risk reporting, whereas US firms use voluntary risk reporting to 
substitute mandatory risk reporting. Their results document that variations in mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting are influenced by systematic risk, the legal system, and cultural values. 
They also find that the legal system and cultural values have high explanatory power for 
mandatory risk reporting variations over time, but are less important in explaining variations in 
voluntary risk reporting between firms in different countries. 
Finally, considering quality and quantity of  information, Malafronte et al. (2016) adopt an 
automated content analysis approach to study the incentives for risk reporting in insurance firms. 
The results show that European insurers focus on quantity rather than quality of  risk 
information. The amount of  risk information provided in an annual report is associated with 
size and technical provision2, and country-level characteristics. Interestingly, they also find that 
managers provide more risk information to highlight their independence from the global 
financial crisis. For example, they find that the CEO’s letter to shareholders often describes and 
discusses how the firm has faced and/or overcome the crisis. Indeed, they find that most 
companies in their sample use their risk disclosure to talk about the financial crisis, as opposed to 
ignoring it, and to explain how they are – or how they enacted strategies to make themselves 
appear – independent from it.  
                                                          
2 Technical provisions represent the amount that an insurer requires to fulfil its insurance obligations and 
settle all expected commitments to policyholders and other beneficiaries arising over the lifetime of  the insurer's 
portfolio of  insurance contracts. 
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Summarizing this second group, inevitably, different studies produce different results 
because they use different methods and samples, from different times, and examine different 
countries. However, a clear implication is that size is positively associated with increased 
disclosure, and another is that regulation can lead to more voluntary reporting, such that 
mandatory and voluntary reporting are often complements rather than substitutes. In addition, 
risk reporting tends to be more non-financial than financial, historic rather than future 
orientated, good news rather than bad, and qualitative rather than quantitative. 
2.3 Disclosure indices 
The third group we identify employs a topic that has a long history in accounting – the 
disclosure index. Indeed, there is a comprehensive review of  the early papers in this field which 
dates back to 1991 (Marston & Shrives, 1991). Our review starts somewhat later, with Marshall 
and Weetman (2007), who examine the risk information asymmetry gap by comparing UK and 
US non-financial firms’ external risk reporting against the managerial information set; 
determining the former by way of  a disclosure index and the latter by way of  a survey. The index 
is constructed around the themes covered by the survey. In other words, they do not measure 
compliance with UK or US accounting standards per se, but focus on issues that they expect to be 
disclosed based on responses to their survey. Ultimately, this covers the key theme of  foreign 
exchange risk disclosure. They find that disclosures provided by firms in both jurisdictions are 
incomplete. They show the information gap to be lower in the USA – where firms have higher 
levels of  financial risk – and the gap is greatest for firms operating in competitive product 
markets. In contrast, the UK evidence suggests that the information gap is narrowest when 
financial risk is higher. They argue that regulators should be given flexibility to determine risk 
disclosure requirements according to jurisdiction-specific management disclosure practices.  
Deumes and Knechel (2008) employ a risk reporting disclosure index – based on six 
separately identifiable internal control factors, to investigate whether, and if  so to what degree, 
the legal regulatory environment and the existence of  agency conflicts incentivize the voluntary 
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provision of  risk information. They find that economic incentives for voluntary internal control 
reporting exist in a low-regulation context, as in the Netherlands. Additionally, they find a 
negative relationship between the extent of  internal control disclosure and management and 
block holder ownership, as well as a positive relationship between the extent of  such disclosure 
and financial leverage. They suggest that regulators might wish to allow firms flexibility in their 
risk-related internal control reporting choices.  
Looking at initial public offerings (IPOs) on the London Stock Exchange, Hill and Short 
(2009) undertake a manual content analysis of  firms’ risk warning statements and IPO 
prospectuses to develop an index based upon the existence of  risk warning disclosures. They 
analyze risk topics into the following seven categories: (i) internal risks; (ii) external risks; and (iii) 
corporate development; (iv) third-party risks; (v) information risks; (vi) ongoing claims and 
disputes; and (vii) ‘boiler plate’ disclosures. Following this coding exercise, they draw on 
frameworks developed in prior work – namely, Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley (2004), Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004), and Linsley and Shrives (2006) – to assess the quality of  risk disclosure over 
time (1991-2003). They analyze the types of  disclosure along the following dimensions: (i) time 
orientation; (ii) ﬁnancial/non-ﬁnancial; (iii) quantitative/qualitative; (iv) economic sign; and (v) 
risk management strategies. They find that while firms tend to reveal a high proportion of  
forward-looking information, they tend to reveal a low proportion of  information on internal 
controls and risk management. The results also document that managerial ownership is 
negatively associated with risk disclosure.  
Taylor et al. (2010) find that levels of  corporate governance and the need to raise capital 
are positively related to the ‘extent’ of  Australian firms’ mandatory and discretionary financial 
risk disclosure; where extent is measured using an index comprising 27 financial risk 
management disclosure items consisting of  13 mandatory items and 14 discretionary ones. The 
results also indicate that an overseas exchange listing is negatively associated with these firms’ 
financial risk disclosures. Interestingly, being cross-listed also has a negative impact on the 
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quantity of  both mandatory and voluntary risk information. Taylor et al. (2010) also note 
significant positive impact of  International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on 
that information being revealed. Finally, they find that larger and highly leveraged firms tend to 
provide more risk information.  
Using the disclosures of  European banks (85 banks from 20 EU countries) as their 
context, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) investigate the direct and joint effects of  governance, 
regulation, and supervision on the quality of  operational risk disclosure. They define direct 
effects as firm-level managerial risk disclosure decisions, and joint effects as a function of  
contagion, driven by a combination of  availability of  information through other sources and 
mandatory requirements of  accounting standards. They use a self-constructed disclosure index 
to measure operational risk disclosure, composed of  14 main themes3, and comprising 4 sub-
items per theme4 (binary-coded, maximum score 56 points). They find that bank governance has 
a significant positive impact on operational risk disclosure, and that supervision is an essential 
element of  that impact.  
Also using banks’ risk reporting as their context, Al-Hadi et al. (2016) investigate the 
impact of  a risk committee and its characteristics on market risk disclosure. Interestingly, they 
examine banks’ disclosures in a less developed market, namely in the Gulf  Cooperation Council 
(GCC) region. The GCC is a regional political organization comprising the energy rich Gulf  
monarchies, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
They find that banks with a separate risk committee provide more market risk disclosure. These 
banks’ decisions regarding the disclosure of  risk information are also influenced by risk 
                                                          
3 These themes are as follows: (i) amount of  regulatory capital for operational risk; (ii) measurement 
approach of  regulatory capital for operational risk; (iii) strategies and processes of  operational risk management; (iv) 
structure and organization of  the operational risk management function; (v) scope and nature of  the operational 
risk reporting system; (vi) operational risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques; (vii) operational value-at-risk; 
(viii) internal audit function/internal control system; (ix) key risk indicators/early warning systems; (x) self-
assessment techniques; (xi) scorecard models/scenario analysis/stress tests; (xii) operational risk event databases; 
(xiii) legal risks; and (xiv) additional information on operational risk exposure and management. 
4 These 14 main themes have four standardized sub-items which lead to the maximum score of  56 points: (i) 
qualitative information; (ii) quantitative information; (iii) forward-looking information; and (iv) graphical illustration 
or tabular presentation. 
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committee characteristics including size and the qualification status of  the members. The results 
are more pronounced for more mature banks. 
To summarize, this third group of  studies shows that risk disclosures are often more 
extensive in larger companies or companies with superior corporate governance. Several of  these 
studies advise regulators to allow some flexibility regarding disclosure so that companies can 
follow the spirit of  risk reporting, without the constraints on the flow of  information which 
might arise from over-regulation (Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Marshall & Weetman, 2007). This is 
consistent with the recommendation from the second group of  studies (using content analysis) 
that flexible regulation can encourage more voluntary reporting. The ‘comply or explain’ 
approach used in corporate governance may be the way to encourage better reporting. The 
rationale behind ‘comply or explain’ is that it allows the market to decide what is (ir)relevant. 
Under this system, regulators set out a code which listed companies may either comply with, or 
if  they do not comply, explain publicly why they do not.  
Overall, research in this area examines factors (at firm and country levels) that motivate 
firms to provide information about their risks in their annual reports. Table 3 lists these 16 
articles on incentives for risk reporting, identifies areas of  divergence (based on method and 
context), thereby suggesting a way forward for future research (see Section 5). 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
3. Empirical research on the informativeness of risk reporting  
This section discusses studies examining whether risk information is informative for 
shareholders, reviewing 12 papers that can be broadly classified based on their datasets and the 
methods used to measure risk disclosure and informativeness. Table 4 provides more details on 
these papers, summarizes their findings, and provides insights into potential extensions and/or 
limitations.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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Much of  the work related to the informativeness of  risk disclosure is based on US 
companies (nine articles out of  12). Further, the majority of  studies rely on either a manual or an 
automated content analysis technique, utilizing sentence and/or word as a unit of  coding to 
quantify risk information that is then examined for statistical associations with various stock 
market indicators. Our discussion below is divided into two broad themes based on US and non-
US research that examines the informativeness of  risk disclosure. Within each theme, we 
highlight variations in the methods employed to measure risk disclosure informativeness. 
3.1 Risk reporting: US Evidence 
Among the nine papers that use US datasets, the early evidence (i.e., Akhigbe & Martin, 2008; 
Hodder & McAnally, 2001; Jorion, 2002; Rajgopal, 1999; Roulstone, 1999) is based on small 
sample sizes that are industry-orientated (oil and gas, non-financial firms, and financial firms). 
However, the recent US-based research (i.e., Bao & Datta, 2014; Filzen, 2015; Hope et al., 2016; 
Kravet & Muslu, 2013) makes use of  much larger datasets, of  structured filings (i.e., 10-Ks) that 
are publicly available, and advances in machine-learning based techniques which make 
quantification-based measures more straightforward to perform.   
Rajgopal (1999) is among the early studies examining the informativeness of  FRR No. 48 
disclosures. 5 He uses US oil and gas firms as the context to his study. He finds that market risk 
disclosure is positively associated with equity return sensitivity to oil and gas price changes, 
suggesting that such disclosure is informative. His findings also show that investors are sensitive 
to the various formats in which information is presented, in this case, tabular and sensitivity 
analysis.6 The results suggest that these formats provide different information, each is 
incrementally valuable, and they are not substitutes for each other.  
                                                          
5 This Securities and Exchange Commission Financial Reporting Release requires companies to disclose both 
quantitative and qualitative information about potential losses arising from the use of  financial instruments, and 
covers interest rates, commodity prices, foreign currency rates, and equity investments. In so doing, companies have 
the choice of  disclosure formats - tabular, sensitivity analysis, and Value at Risk (VaR) – as well as three 
measurement bases - cash flows, earnings, and fair values.  
6 Note, Rajgopal (1999) does not discuss the Value at Risk format. 
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In contrast to Rajgopal’s (1999) conclusion that the different disclosure formats are 
incrementally informative, Hodder and McAnally (2001) suggest that FRR No. 48 disclosures 
hamper investors’ comparisons of  companies because of  the flexibility over disclosure formats 
and measurement basis. Furthermore, they claim that FRR No. 48 requirements related to the 
disclosure of  quantitative information are not sufficiently informative to enable investors to 
evaluate market risk exposure fully. They propose a methodology for converting the quantitative 
information content of  market risk disclosures under the tabular format to sensitivity measures 
(pp.67-71), and also from the tabular format to Value at Risk (pp.71-74).  
On the same theme, Roulstone (1999) finds that whilst there is evidence of  an increase in 
the amount of  financial risk disclosure following the release of  FRR No. 48, there is variation 
across firms, a lack of  detail regarding the assumptions and limitations in sensitivity and VaR 
disclosures, and a lack of  firm-specific information. In a similar vein, but focusing on financial 
firms, Jorion’s (2002) investigation of  the relation between VaR disclosures and the subsequent 
variability of  banks’ unexpected trading revenues, finds VaR disclosures useful in predicting 
trading revenue in the banking sector, for a sample of  eight banks. Using a self-constructed 
disclosure index to measure the VaR disclosure for the largest 10 US banks from 1996 to 2005, 
Pérignon and Smith (2010) find that there is an upward trend in the quantity of  VaR disclosure 
and historical simulation is by far the most common method used in calculating VaR.7 They also 
find that VaR disclosure is not informative as it does not impact the future volatility of  trading 
revenues. 
The five  above-mentioned papers focus principally on the impact of  risk regulations (i.e., 
SEC requirements) on market indicators. A further important consideration which can affect 
managerial disclosure decision-making is the level of  corporate governance. Akhigbe and Martin 
                                                          
7 Their index comprises six components: (i) VaR characteristics (holding period and confidence level), (ii) 
summary VaR statistics, (iii) summary information about the previous year’s VaR, (iv) histogram or plot of  daily 
VaRs, (v) definition of  trading revenues (hypothetical revenues and non-inclusion of  trading fees) and histogram or 
plot of  daily trading revenues, and (vi) backtesting (number of  exceptions, i.e., days when actual trading loss is 
greater than VaR, and explanations of  these exceptions). 
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(2008) test the effects of  corporate governance and disclosure on firms’ risk after SOX (2002).8 
Their testing is based on estimated changes in capital market measures of  total risk, idiosyncratic 
risk, and systematic risk that occur between the pre-SOX period and the post-SOX period. Their 
prediction of  increased levels of  risk disclosure was based on the idea that SOX should provide 
higher levels of  assurance. They find that financial firms were rewarded (punished) for stronger 
(weaker) disclosure and stronger (weaker) governance.  
Unlike early US-based research on the informativeness of  FRR No. 48, recent US-based 
research (three out of  the 12 papers) focuses on the informativeness of  item 1A, Risk Factors, 
of  the 10-K filing, mandated in 2005. This US-based research is aided by advanced qualitative 
data analysis tools that permit more customized data gathering across a larger sample of  firms 
and have attracted much interest from researchers in examining the informativeness of  the risk 
information. 
Kravet and Muslu’s (2013) is among the first to test for the informativeness of  narrative 
risk disclosures. Their study employed a machine-learning content analysis approach, which 
involved designing a Practical Extraction and Report Language (PERL) code to parse the annual 
report into sentences. The code then tagged a sentence as risk-related if  it included at least one 
risk-related keyword (self-developed ‘bag-of-words’ based on reading 100 randomly selected 
annual reports).9 They use a sample of  28,110 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2007 to 
investigate how changes in risk disclosures are related to changes in investor and analyst activities 
before and after 10-K filings. To that end, they suggest three arguments. The first is the null 
argument, which predicts that analysts will not revise their forecasts differently if  they assess risk 
disclosures to be uninformative. Kravet and Muslu (2013) define these uninformative disclosures 
as boiler-plate, which would mean that the risk disclosure is overly generalized and therefore 
                                                          
8 Firms’ risk is measured by volatility of  stock returns, beta, and the variance of  the residuals from the 
ordinary least squares estimation of  the single-factor market model using daily returns.  
9 The risk-related words are as follows: can/cannot, could, may, might, risk*, uncertain*, likely to, subject to, 
potential*, vary*/varies, depend*, expos*, fluctuat*, possibl*, susceptible, affect, influenc*, and hedg*. Words 
marked with a * also include derivatives of  the original. 
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does not affect users’ perceptions of  risk. The second argument, a divergence argument, states that 
risk disclosure increases users’ risk perceptions by revealing previously unknown risk factors. The 
third argument, a convergence argument, states that risk disclosure decreases users’ risk perceptions 
by confirming a company’s known risk factors. Generally, their findings support the divergence 
argument, implying that risk disclosure is informative. However, they find stronger relations 
between industry-level risk disclosure and investors’ perceptions of  risk than for firm-level 
disclosure. This finding supports criticism in prior work that company-specific risk information 
is lacking in annual reports (e.g., Schrand & Elliott, 1998; Kaplan, 2011).  
Re-examining the three competing arguments put forward by Kravet and Muslu (2013), 
Bao and Datta (2014) examine a sample of  7,679 US firm-year observations from 2006 to 2010. 
In contrast to prior work which employed a pre-determined set of  key words or sentences to 
detect risk information, instead they use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic model (LDA) to 
classify and quantify risk information in the narrative sections of  10-Ks.10 This work is, to date, 
the most comprehensive categorization of  the content of  risk disclosure within 10-Ks. They 
identify 30 types of  risk disclosure and examine the impact of  each type on the volatility of  the 
stock return.11 They identify different informativeness patterns. Specifically, they find that, while 
22 types are non-significant (supporting the null argument), three types of  risk disclosure 
(funding, macroeconomic cyclical industry, and credit risks) are positively related to investor-
perceived risk (supporting the divergence argument), and the other five types (human resources, 
regulation changes, infrastructure, operation disruption, and debt risks) are negatively related to 
it (supporting the convergence argument).   
Using a different source and approach to quantifying risk information, Filzen (2015) 
examines the informativeness of  risk disclosure by focusing on updates within the risk factor 
statements in quarterly reports, using a sample of  13,165 firm-quarters. The findings support 
                                                          
10 LDA is a probabilistic modeling technique used to identify underlying topics that occur within, for 
example, the risk factors section or any other section of  the 10-K filing, or any other events such as conference calls. 
It extrapolates backwards to those topics that could have generated the outcomes. 
11  See Bao and Datta (2014, Figure 6, page 1382) for a list of  the 30 types of  risk. 
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Kravet and Muslu’s (2013) divergence argument regarding informativeness. Filzen (2015) shows 
that risk factor updates are associated with adverse outcomes as measured by abnormal returns 
and negative earnings revelations.  
3.2 Risk reporting: Non-US evidence  
A second stream of  research examining the informativeness of  risk disclosure is non-US-based 
(three out of  12 papers: two within the UK and one within Egypt). Relying on four FTSE100-
listed Food Producers and Processors companies between 2002 and 2007, Abraham and Shrives 
(2014) measure the quality of  risk disclosure informativeness as a function of  three themes, 
namely (i) that risk factor disclosure should be specific to the company, (ii) that managers 
evaluate their risk disclosures on a regular basis, identifying significant events12 ex ante to avoid 
repetitious annual reporting; and (iii) that actual risk experiences are discussed in the risk-factor 
statements. An innovative and distinguishing feature of  their content analysis approach is the use 
of  plagiarism detection software (Ferret) to check for similarities in risk sentences over time. In 
line with prior work (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Kravet & Muslu, 2013), the authors query 
whether non-specific (boilerplate) risk disclosure limit its usefulness. This provides a similarity 
measure (continuous) ranging from 0 (no copying detected) to 1 (everything copied). Combined 
with their content analysis, the authors categorise disclosure into substantive and symbolic; 
where the former describes company specific disclosure whilst the latter describes information 
that is general in nature and which might apply to any business or any business within the 
industry. They find that companies provide a large amount of  risk disclosure which is general 
rather than specific, and where the substance of  the risk-factor discussion remains the same over 
time (Cadbury: 71%; Tate and Lyle: 100%; Associated British Foods: 57%; Unilever: 60%). Thus, 
they conclude that firms provide more symbolic disclosure than substantive.13  
                                                          
12 Significant events are identified based on news events with economically significant price changes over a 
five-year period. 
13 Unchanging disclosures may indicate a failure to adapt reporting to specific circumstances, but they may be 
useful to readers if  they clearly indicate that the risk profile of  the firm has remained the same. While the text of  the 
disclosure should change as the risk profile alters, changing the structure or minor details of  the text’s content for 
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Linsley and Lawrence (2007) take a different perspective on informativeness by examining 
levels of  readability and obfuscation of  the risk disclosure, rather than stock market indicators. 
They use the Flesch Reading Ease formula to measure the readability of  the risk disclosure, and 
coefficients of  variation are used to measure obfuscation. Their study finds that the mean 
readability scores for the risk disclosure of  the 25 largest non-financial firms on the UK FTSE 
100 are all below 50, signifying ‘difficult’ or ‘very difficult’ to read. However, they find no 
evidence to suggest that directors are deliberately obfuscating or concealing bad risk news 
through their writing style. They conclude that, despite suggestions that companies provide 
greater amounts of  risk information (e.g., ICAEW, 1997), this will not necessarily lead to 
improved risk communication unless directors write with greater clarity.   
Elbannan and Elbannan (2015) examines whether bank risk disclosures are associated with 
operating performance and market valuation within the Egyptian context. This paper examines 
the impact of  risk disclosure on various operating performance measures, based on the balanced 
scorecard and stock market performance.14 They find risk disclosure to be positively associated 
with operating performance and market indicators during the non-financial crisis period (2002-
2008), but the association is weaker during the financial crisis (2009-2011). They also find that 
informativeness is conditional on the risk disclosure area i.e., credit, liquidity, market, or interest 
rate risk. 
To summarize, a few common themes emerge across this body of  work. Studies suggest 
that in US and Egyptian contexts, risk disclosures may influence capital market participants, 
whereas in the UK there is limited evidence of  this (e.g., Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et 
al., 2013; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). Meanwhile, the observed informativeness varies across 
companies and risk areas. Table 5 presents the reviewed papers that study informativeness of  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the sole purpose of  making it appear different is not desirable. However, an advantage of  using a form-oriented 
content analysis approach is that this issue can be addressed in the analysis. 
14 Elbannan and Elbannan (2015: 193) measure operating performance as a multi-dimensional concept 
comprised of  financial, customer, internal business processes, and learning and growth dimensions. 
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risk disclosure, identifies areas of  divergence (based on method and context), thereby suggesting 
a way forward for future research (See Section 5). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4. Empirical research investigating incentives and informativeness   
In his review of  textual analysis of  corporate disclosures, Li (2010) highlights the importance of  
examining informativeness in combination with managerial incentives. This combination was 
highlighted as one area for future research on risk reporting by Kravet and Muslu (2013).  
Although studies investigating both incentives and informativeness are relatively uncommon, we 
have identified four recent papers that do so, as detailed in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The first paper is Campbell et al. (2014), which examines 9,076 firm-year observations 
from 2005 to 2008. It examines whether the content of  item 1A–Risk Factors is reflective of  the 
firm’s risk level and whether risk information is associated with systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, 
information asymmetry, and firm value. In line with other studies (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013, 
2015; Kravet & Muslu, 2013), the authors employ an extensive word list15 to identify risk 
information. This enables them to classify risk-related statements into one of  the following 
groups: financial, systematic, idiosyncratic, legal and regulatory, or tax. They find a positive 
association between risk factor disclosure and pre-disclosure levels of  firm risk, and that the 
types of  risks a firm faces are associated with the types of  risks disclosed in the risk-factor 
section. In contrast to Abraham and Shrives (2014), this suggests that, within these broad 
categories, firms are disclosing substantive company-specific risk information rather than 
symbolic, generic risk information. In other words, managers provide risk information which is 
meaningful according to the specific risks that their firm faces. In relation to informativeness, 
they find that changes in risk disclosure (unexpected risk disclosure) influence investors’ 
assessments of  firm risk and value, in support of  the divergence argument (Kravet & Muslu, 2013).  
                                                          
15 For the Campbell et al. (2014) word-list, see their Table 9, Appendix 3, pp. 443-452. 
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Second, Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) examine whether risk, ownership structure, capital 
structure, external equity financing, and borrowing are associated with risk disclosure and 
whether the tone of  risk disclosure affects investors’ risk perceptions for a sample of  German 
non-financial firms. In line with Campbell et al. (2014), they find that risk disclosure is more 
significantly associated with the underlying risk of  a firm (i.e., market beta) than other incentives 
(i.e., ownership structure, capital structure, external equity finance, and borrowing). In relation to 
informativeness, they find that the tone of  risk disclosure is associated with investors’ risk 
perception. Specifically, the German market tends to positively (negatively) price good (bad) 
news about risk, either by improving (worsening) market liquidity by mitigating (exacerbating) 
information asymmetries, or by decreasing (increasing) investor-perceived risk. 
Elshandidy and Neri (2015) study a sample of  non-financial firms in the UK and Italy 
and examine how corporate governance influences firms’ decisions to reveal risk information 
mandatorily and/or voluntarily, and then study the impact of  observed risk reporting on market 
liquidity. They find corporate governance factors to be associated with risk disclosure in both 
countries, but more strongly with voluntary disclosure among UK firms and mandatory 
disclosure among Italian firms. In both countries, risk disclosure is positively associated with 
market liquidity, but voluntary disclosure is found to have a stronger association than mandatory 
disclosure. 
Finally, Hope et al. (2016) examine the informativeness of  risk information using a 
computing algorithm to quantify firms’ levels of  ‘specificity’. The scoring system identifies the 
inclusion of  specific items in firms’ qualitative risk-factor disclosures. For example a firm will 
score higher where risk-factor disclosures include: the names of  persons, locations, and 
organizations; quantifications of  risk, such as values in percentages and money values in dollars; 
and chronological information, such as times and dates. They scale the volume of  such 
disclosure by the total number of  words in the risk-factor disclosure section. The higher the 
‘specificity’ score, the more specific the risk disclosures are. They find that the overall proportion 
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of  specific risk disclosure is low (5% of  total disclosures). However, they also find a strong 
positive association between specificity and both short-term price reactions and trading volumes, 
subsequent to the 10-K filing. Thereby, they suggest that more specific risk-factor disclosures 
benefit users of  financial statements. Concerning the informativeness of  risk disclosure, the 
study also shows that companies with higher proprietary costs provide less specific risk 
information.  
Table 7 presents the reviewed papers that deal with both incentives and informativeness, 
identifies areas of  divergence (based on method and context), thereby suggesting a way forward 
for future research (see Section 5). 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5. Discussion, challenges, and directions for future research  
A number of  key themes emerge from the prior literature. In the following sub-sections, we 
collate these themes, discuss the limitations of  the prior work, and identify gaps in the literature. 
We begin by identifying the following issues that primarily divide the literature: (1) incentives 
versus informativeness; (2) type of  disclosure (i.e., voluntary versus mandatory); (3) type of  
content analysis (i.e., automated versus manual); (4) type of  analysis (i.e., within-country versus 
cross-country variations); and (5) type of  sector (i.e., financial versus non-financial). For each 
issue, we highlight and suggest how researchers might approach inherent problems. These issues 
are the five design decisions that must be considered by researchers undertaking risk-reporting 
research. Further limitations exist, including risk-related conceptual aspects (i.e., concept, types, 
and measurement), and the potential role of  the standard-setters in developing and improving 
risk reporting. 
5.1. Grouping previous literature 
5.1.1. Incentives versus informativeness: Divergence 
This issue is the first of  five that divide the EU/AUS and US risk-reporting literatures. The 
heavily regulated risk-reporting environment in the USA has encouraged research in that 
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jurisdiction towards investigations of  the informativeness of  the mandated risk disclosures. 
Meanwhile, research in the EU/AUS – where disclosure of  risk has traditionally been voluntary 
– has broadly focused on the incentives question.16 The SEC highlights and actively seeks to 
address the issue of  whether the disclosed risk information is actually informative for investors 
and companies, and not simply compliant with the regulations. Academic research has picked up 
this baton, and the issues of  de jure compliance, boiler-plate disclosures and substantive versus 
symbolic disclosures is a common theme throughout this risk reporting review.  
There are a handful of  papers that defy this discernible trend, i.e., informativeness in 
EU/AUS-based research and incentives in US-based. Dobler (2008) and Kravet and Muslu 
(2013), for example, note that the incentives to disclose is an important issue in both high and 
low-regulated environments, and these incentives have been empirically examined in the USA 
(Campbell et al., 2014; Hope et al., 2016), Finland (Miihkinen, 2012, 2013), and Germany 
(Elshandidy & Shrives, 2016).  
Until recently, in Europe and Australasia, risk information was provided largely 
voluntarily (e.g., Buckby, Gallery, & Ma, 2015; Dobler, 2008; ICAEW, 1997, 2011; Miihkinen, 
2012). Therefore, the questions of  why, and to what extent, firms disclose risk information have 
taken precedence. However, the informativeness issue has started to be addressed in the 
EU/AUS context (e.g., Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elshandidy & Shrives, 2016; Miihkinen, 2013). 
This may be due to increased pressure from professional bodies (e.g., ICAEW, 2011). It may also 
be because data availability and more sophisticated content analysis techniques have helped to 
improve the accuracy of  the mandatory/voluntary risk disclosure identification and analysis 
process. In turn, this has enabled more straightforward investigations of  the associations 
between variations in risk disclosure and market indicators.  
5.1.2. Incentives versus informativeness: Limitations and future work 
                                                          
16 In Tables 2 and 4, 88% (14 out of  16) of  the reviewed papers concerning incentives are within the context 
(jurisdiction) of  Europe and Australia. Meanwhile, 75% (9 out of  12) of  the reviewed papers concerning 
informativeness are in a US context. 
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The ways in which internal governance factors (e.g., management, directors, and employees) 
interact with external (e.g., law and regulation, ownership structure, governance rating and 
voting, and external auditing), and whether they motivate managerial risk disclosure decisions, 
remain unanswered (for a review of  these factors see, Gillan, 2006: 384). External governance 
factors can facilitate or discourage active stakeholder participation in the management process, as 
external governance concerns the role of  direct shareholder oversight and thus incorporates the 
market for corporate control (Baber, Liang, & Zhu, 2012). Internal governance factors relate to 
the interaction between or among firm insiders. Another area of  research requiring attention is 
how internal control affects firms’ efficiency in externally reporting their risks.  
All of  the previous studies are concerned with equity markets, with no study yet addressing 
risk reporting in debt markets. Such studies are required to identify how firms’ risk disclosure 
strategies affect the following: (i) debt providers’ decisions; (ii) credit ratings; and (iii) predicting 
distress, default, and bankruptcy risks. Other areas that warrant examination include: (iv) how 
firms manage their risks in relation to what they report on their risks; and (v) the determinants 
of  higher (lower) levels of  hedge accounting, the implications of  hedge accounting as a risk 
management strategy, and the extent to which the markets react to variations in hedge 
accounting approaches. Finally, while the majority of  the prior literature concentrates on risk 
reporting in annual reports, considering other outlets such as conference calls, earnings press 
releases, and media coverage might provide a clearer picture of  how managers change their risk-
reporting message to suit their audience (Kothari, Li, & Short, 2009; Li, 2010).  
5.1.3. Voluntary versus mandatory risk reporting: Divergence  
An unintended consequence of  the SEC’s development of  FRR No. 48 was that it focused US 
research on mandatory reporting, while the reluctance of  the IASB and other domestic standard-
setters to provide similar risk disclosure regulations in the rest of  the world has driven 
researchers working in that context to focus on the voluntary reporting. There is evidence 
(Elshandidy et al., 2015) that voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure may complement each 
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other, confirming Bagnoli and Watts’ (2007) and Einhorn’s (2005) findings to that effect.  
However, there is a second strand of  research which supports a substitutive effect. Gigler and 
Hemmer (2001), for example, argue that mandatory disclosure requirements has a negative effect 
on voluntary disclosure levels and in line with this view Butler, Kraft and Weiss (2007) find 
mandatory disclosure to be a substitute for voluntary disclosure. This supports Dye’s (1985) 
proposition that making disclosure mandatory may not necessarily benefit the audience, as 
voluntary disclosure may be lost. 
5.1.4. Voluntary versus mandatory risk reporting: Limitations and future work 
This divergence raises an important question: should standard-setters forge ahead with stand-
alone risk-reporting regulation?17 Our review suggests that there could be certain practical 
advantages to making risk disclosure mandatory, including (i) providing stakeholders, especially 
investors and analysts, with information to aid them to  enforce management’s fiduciary duties 
and thus contribute to the alleviation of  agency problems, (ii) providing a level of  public 
accountability and/or enforceability that would increase the credibility of  disclosure, (iii) helping 
ease information asymmetry, and (iv) enhancing transparency, and in turn more difficult for 
controlling insiders to consume private benefits. However, making risk disclosure mandatory also 
carries potential costs, including, but not limited to, (i) engendering competitive disadvantages as 
companies are forced to release sensitive information, (ii) the loss of  potentially useful 
voluntarily disclosed information, and (iii) the potential loss of  meaning due to the production 
of  boilerplate information. 
Maintaining a system of  informative voluntary disclosure also has benefits and costs. 
Potential benefits include, but are not limited to, (i) enhanced credibility and improved investor 
relations, (ii) access to more liquid markets, (iii) improved pricing and decision-making 
                                                          
17 Schrand and Elliott’s (1998) review summarizes the main discussions from the American Accounting 
Association (AAA) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) conference, addressing obstacles to the 
issuing of  a risk-reporting accounting standard. They highlight that much of  the extant research focuses on the effects 
of  risk rather than on how investors assess risk, thus providing little explicit guidance as to which disclosures can aid 
investors’ risk assessment.  
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capabilities, (iv) a reduction in perceived risk, increased reputations, and a lower cost of  capital, 
and (v) reduced litigation risk. Potential costs might include (i) competitive disadvantage if  
sensitive information is disclosed, (ii) bargaining weaknesses related to stakeholders, (iii) 
increased litigation risk, and (iv) preparation and audit costs.  
Judged collectively, the evidence from risk-reporting research seems to suggest that 
regulation can be informative in certain circumstances – e.g., for oil and gas firms (Roulstone, 
1999), or, more generally, for non-financial firms (Miihkinen, 2012) – but less so in more 
complex cases e.g., interest rate risk (Hodder et al., 2002). However, mandating disclosure 
encourages higher levels of  it when there is no other incentive to disclose and therefore helps to 
reduce information asymmetry (e.g., Dobler, 2008). Furthermore, the incentives to voluntarily 
disclose information appear to be relatively low precisely when they might be most desirable, for 
example when financial risk is high (Marshall & Weetman, 2007). While theories of  voluntary 
disclosure may explain context-specific findings, there is no explanation of  the usefulness of  any 
single or multiple theoretical perspectives for why firms are incentivized to reveal risk 
information (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). This needs further exploration regardless of  the 
methodological approach, or underpinning narrative. Future researchers need to begin 
developing a theory of  risk disclosure (see Heinle & Smith, 2017) as well as extending the extant 
knowledge of  theories of  voluntary disclosure. 
5.1.5. Manual versus automated content analysis: Divergence  
Our review highlights a further key divergence in the literature. Since the technology has been 
available and large datasets have been accessible, much of  the work originating from the USA 
has relied on automated content analysis. Methods are becoming increasingly complex as 
accounting and finance researchers learn and apply skills and techniques from other disciplines. 
Li’s (2010) analysis encourages advancements as he challenges researchers to reach further.  
In the EU/AUS, research has generally relied on the design and construction of  disclosure 
indices to measure the quality and/or quantity of  risk reporting (e.g., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
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Miihkinen, 2012). Often this relies on manual content analysis. Whilst automated content analysis 
approaches might have problems and limitations, so do manual ones (e.g., Beattie & Thomson, 
2007). Recent work has attempted to address these concerns, as well as focusing on the coding 
reliability problems raised by, amongst others, Krippendorff  (2012). Nevertheless, opportunities 
remain for further developments and improvements (see Beattie, 2014), in risk-reporting 
research, where an employable, usable, accurate and reliable ‘quality’ measurement system is 
needed. 
There are exceptions to this division; more recently, automated content analysis has been 
employed in EU/AUS work to measure quantity, and this is where the jurisdictional literatures 
converge. For example, risk word lists have been developed to analyze firms’ risk reporting. 
While this system has been criticized (Loughran & McDonald, 2016), it is a method that should 
be developed further. Whilst there is substantial overlap in the several ‘bag-of-words’ automated 
content analysis risk-disclosure studies (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015; Kravet & Muslu, 
2013), agreeing on a core set of  risk-related words is a non-trivial matter.  
5.1.6. Manual versus automated content analysis: Limitations and future work 
First, we note that prior risk reporting research has relied on the annual report or the 10-K form. 
Future researchers might find it worthwhile considering different outlets, especially as the annual 
report is suggested to play a largely confirmatory role (e.g., Gigler & Hemmer, 2001). In line with 
Li (2010), we urge future researchers to consider other communication events, such as 
conference calls. These events have the potential to provide dominant stakeholders (i.e., analysts 
and investors) with new information (e.g., Barker, Hendry, Roberts, & Sanderson, 2012; 
Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 2011; Roberts, Sanderson, Barker, & Hendry, 2006), possibly in 
non-traditional ways (e.g., through body language, reputation; see e.g., Davis, Ge, Matsumoto, & 
Zhang, 2014; Matsumoto et al., 2011; Mayew & Venkatachalam, 2012). 
To investigate scholars’ adoption of  automated content analysis of  risk reporting in annual 
reports, Bao and Datta (2014) differentiate between three main approaches: (i) the dictionary 
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method, (ii) supervised learning, and (iii) unsupervised learning. The dictionary method relies on 
the usage of  a specific key word, and frequency counts, drawing general conclusions based on 
the quantification of  the disclosures measured against market indicators, or by dividing those 
frequencies into certain groups or types (Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; 
Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). The problem identified by Bao and Datta (2014) is 
that this method uses dictionaries to classify the documents into specific groups, which might 
lead to inefficiencies if  the dictionaries are being applied outside of  the domains for which they 
were originally developed (see also Li, 2010; Loughran & McDonald, 2016).  
To avoid this issue, researchers can use the second approach mentioned above, supervised 
learning. This method relies on two steps: initially, human coders categorize a set of  documents 
by hand; then, they train a supervised model that learns automatically how to assign categories to 
documents using coded data. An advantage of  this approach is that its results are easily validated 
using designated performance statistics.  
The dictionary approach benefits from its inherent simplicity, the supervised learning 
approach from its flexibility and ease of  validation. However, both rely on a predefined 
categorization system. The third type, unsupervised learning (sometimes known as unsupervised 
clustering), refers to a class of  methods that learn the underlying features of  a text without 
explicitly imposing categories of  interest. This approach uses modeling assumptions and 
properties of  the texts to estimate a set of  categories and simultaneously assign documents (or 
other units of  analysis such as sentences) to those categories. Examples of  studies that apply this 
approach are Bao and Datta (2014) and Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence (2016). 
We suggest that all three automated approaches possess benefits and drawbacks, and whilst 
technology will inevitably define how the field develops, it seems that both the US and EU/AUS 
literatures would benefit from giving them due consideration. Equally, the US literature might 
benefit from closer study of  individual firms’ risk reporting. Ryan (2012a) concludes that the 
reliance on large-sample, cross-sectional data, and the application of  regression analysis, might 
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be the underlying reason for the failure to identify risk relevance. He argues that this obscures 
the potential importance of  individual firms’ risk disclosure. Therefore, we suggest that there is a 
gap in the literature, which might be filled by high-quality comparative case studies.  
5.1.7. Within-country or cross-country variations in risk disclosure: Divergence 
Most of  the papers reviewed consider just one jurisdiction (26 out of  32 papers), or on a few 
occasions two or three (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Marshall & 
Weetman, 2007). Nonetheless, some recent papers look at risk practices with a multi-country 
design (more than three countries), either in financial firms (Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland, 
2015; Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013), insurance firms (Malafronte et al., 2016), 
or non-financial firms (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; Moumen, Ben Othman, & Hussainey, 
2015).18  One common practice among all the above-mentioned papers is that they control for 
country impact by including the country-fixed effects in their econometric models. Little 
attention has been paid to combining institutional factors (e.g., legal system, financial system, and 
cultural values) at the country level with other factors (e.g., size, risk, and growth) at the firm 
level. For example, while Dobler et al. (2011) and Moumen et al. (2015) control for country 
effects by using either a country dummy or the firm-fixed effects neither of  them examine 
specific institutional factors in their models.  
5.1.8. Within-country or cross-country variations on risk disclosure: Limitations and future work  
In a single-country study, it is challenging to capture distinct features, unless those features are 
observable at the firm level when studying incentives (e.g., Buckby et al., 2015; Elshandidy & 
Shrives, 2016; Hassan, 2009; Martikainen, Kinnunen, Miihkinen, & Troberg, 2015; Miihkinen, 
2012; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013) or informativeness (Abdullah, Shukor, Mohamed, & Ahmad, 
2015; Elshandidy & Shrives, 2016; Miihkinen, 2013). Associating variations in risk reporting with 
both firm- and country-level characteristics is becoming an increasingly important empirical 
                                                          
18 Appendix 1 gives details of  the other papers on risk reporting that have been mentioned in this section 
and were not reviewed in Sections 3, 4, and 5. It summarizes those papers’ results and further classifies them based 
on areas of  divergence.  
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question (Elshandidy et al., 2015; Li, 2010). Considering how firm-level factors interact with 
those at the country level might be of  interest to professionals responsible for achieving a 
reasonable level of  international convergence through greater international comparability and 
smaller observed international differences, even after the mandatory adoption of  IFRS (e.g., 
Nobes, 2013). In addition to the problem of  managing data collection in cross-country studies is 
that of  corporate communications in different languages. One solution is to use English as a 
common language (for more details on these issues see for example, Jeanjean, Stolowy, Erkens, 
& Yohn, 2015; Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015). It might also be useful to consider different 
research designs to incorporate the impact of  country level factors, for example multilevel 
econometric techniques, since they provide researchers with better options to capture 
hierarchical structure of  cross-country data (e.g., Hox, 2010). Ignoring data structure can result 
in underestimating the standard errors of  a regression’s coefficients (Steele, 2008). Future 
research might also consider comparing risk-reporting practices between developed and less 
developed (emerging) markets.  
5.1.9. Financial versus non-financial firms: Divergence 
Our review shows that the majority of  reviewed studies (23 out of  32 papers) over the past 20 
years have explored risk reporting amongst non-financial firms. This is in contrast to Schrand 
and Elliott’s (1998) early summary of  risk reporting and indicates a shift in academic research 
from investigating risk disclosure within financial firms to a focus on non-financial firms. In this 
regard, it is striking that Schrand and Elliott (1998) highlight a key feature of  the extant empirical 
risk research at that time as a focus on banks and insurance firms. These authors claim that 
regulators, including the FASB, require disclosure on risk exposure. This recent shift, however, is 
unsurprising. Financial firms are required to comply with stock market regulations as well as 
accounting requirements. Further, their risk management processes, practices, and strategies are 
often fundamentally different from those of  non-financial firms and this adds a layer of  
32 
 
complexity to any study seeking to analyze informativeness or incentives, as well as influencing 
what is voluntary and what is mandatory.  
5.1.10. Financial versus non-financial firms: Limitations and future work  
Scope exists for future research investigating issues more closely related to the nature of  
financial institutions, such as the distinctiveness of  risk reporting amongst competitor 
institutions and across jurisdictions in which regulations are more restrictive or permissive (for a 
recent review on banking see: Beatty & Liao, 2014). Another area in need of  attention from 
researchers is how financial instruments should be reported, given the greater requirements 
imposed by regulatory bodies in this area (for a review see: Ryan, 2012b). Consistent with Ryan 
(2012b), we observe a need for further research investigating the extent to which and how 
financial firms integrate the recognized risk-related consequences of  historical events (i.e., 
historical volatility of  fair values and the current financial leverage) with future-oriented risk 
information related to financial instruments’ major risk types (e.g., market, credit, liquidity, and 
information risks). Regarding firms’ hedging activities, it would be worthwhile studying how and 
why financial firms disclose information about their use of  derivatives or similar instruments 
(e.g., loan commitments, liquidity support arrangements, and recourse obligations in 
securitizations; Ryan (2012b: 298) refers to these instruments, among others, collectively as “risk-
concentrated instruments”) and the extent to which these instruments might aid the assessment 
of  the quality of  firms’ risk management and internal control. Finally, there is limited research 
on how banks’ transparency affects their stability and the role governance might play in 
observing these effects. This is particularly important as banks are quite different from other 
organizations in their excessive risk taking and the impact this has on the financial system as a 
whole (Bushman, 2014). 
5.2. Further limitations and suggestions for future research 
5.2.1. Risk-related conceptual aspects 
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We note that there are differences between researchers’ definitions of  key risk-related terms and 
phrases. In addition, the underlying concepts are sometimes not even considered by the authors, 
hence further attention should be paid to consider the meanings of  risk, risk concepts, risk types, 
and risk measurement. We recommend that future researchers apply risk terminology in a way 
that is coherent and comparable, or state that they are doing otherwise. Further research is 
needed into how risk types can be generated conceptually from financial statement classifications 
(e.g., [i] risks related to income statements, such as volatility of  revenues and net income, [ii] risks 
related to the statement of  financial position, namely assets, liability, and equity). Regarding 
measurement, further research is needed to address the extent to which measures of  risk types 
(e.g., market, credit, liquidity, and operational risks) can be aggregated and how the accounting 
data will fit such measures (particularly considering the differing frequencies associated with 
accounting versus market data). Additionally, further research is required to assess whether the 
current financial accounting model is suitable for capturing the financial effects of  risks in the 
financial statements.  
We also recall the suggestions of  Schrand and Elliott (1998), who conclude that accurately 
identifying a list of  risk types for all firms would be unrealistic, owing to each firm’s inherent 
circumstances and characteristics, which in turn generate different types of  risks. The model, 
together with the type of  data and its quantifiability, are the core issues related to measurement. 
Schrand and Elliott (1998) explain the difficulties of  using a single model of  risk measurement, 
as not all risk types can be measured, and they assert that risk measures should rely on both 
historical and future data. To overcome these weaknesses, they make two suggestions: using 
historical measures (e.g., volatility) of  risk exposure to heighten users’ awareness of  firms’ risks, 
and combining historical with future data using simulation analysis. In general, quantification 
creates a unique set of  problems but, within this context, mis-measurement could result in poor 
decision making. We suggest that in lieu of  better alternatives, a Value at Risk (VaR) model – 
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based on accounting data – might be adopted where applicable and practical.19 This is because 
there is general acceptance of  the underlying principles of  VaR and it is straightforward to 
interpret. However, further research would be beneficial to explore any practical problems and 
solutions related to adoption.  
5.2.2. Standard-setters’ involvement 
In line with both Leuz and Wysocki (2016) and Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010), our paper 
stresses the importance of  the standard-setters’ role and their ability to encourage firms to 
produce decision-useful information. Our review suggests that the current state of  risk reporting 
regulation is at a similar stage to that of  fair-value reporting regulation before the IASB issued a 
specific standard covering fair-value measurement and disclosure. Current regulations on risk 
reporting are spread among a wide range of  accounting standards (e.g., IFRS 7, 9), implying that 
overlap across standards is unavoidable and accurate interpretation challenging. Thus, further 
research is needed to gather and analyze all previous professional publications on risk reporting, 
and more specifically on the issue of  developing a stand-alone risk-reporting accounting 
standard. The basis for our suggestion is that, currently, there is a great deal of  energy and 
attention focused on reviewing how, why, and to what extent firms should reveal information 
about their risks. In line with Ryan’s (2012a) and Dobler’s (2008) arguments, and the empirical 
findings of  Miihkinen (2012, 2013), we find scant support in the present-day literature for 
substantial or substantive benefits to be gained from the introduction of more regulation. 
However, there are those who claim that current regulation could be improved. We propose that 
any formal accounting standard – perhaps incorporating a ‘comply or explain’ philosophy – 
might include the requirement for individual firms to produce a comprehensive ‘risk report’, 
which would contain managerial perspectives on definitional issues such as the risk concept, risk 
definitions, risk types, and risk measurement (strategies, practices, policies, and assumptions).  
                                                          
19 VaR identifies the maximum loss, with a certain degree of  probability (i.e., 90%, 95%, and 99%), that is 
expected specific to a certain item (or items) (e.g., revenues, assets) over the next period (e.g., day, month, and year). 
For a review of  VaR’s methods and techniques, see Jorion (2006).   
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Table 1 
The study sample is based on a search for articles dealing with risk reporting, published after 1997 in journals ranked as 3* (A) or 4* (A*) based on ABS (ABDC) 
Panel A: papers on incentives for risk reporting, presented in chronological order (16 papers discussed in Section 2, categorized in Section 5, and 
summarized in Table 2) 
N Paper Journal 
1  Solomon (1999) The British Accounting Review (BAR) 
2  Solomon, Solomon, Norton, and Joseph (2000) The British Accounting Review (BAR) 
3  Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) The International Journal of Accounting (IJOA) 
4  Linsley and Shrives (2006) The British Accounting Review (BAR) 
5  Abraham and Cox (2007) The British Accounting Review (BAR) 
6  Marshall and Weetman (2007) Journal of Business Finance and Accounting (JBFA) 
7  Deumes and Knechel (2008) Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (AJPT) 
8 Hill and Short (2009)  Accounting and Finance (AF) 
9 Taylor, Tower, and Neilson (2010) Accounting and Finance (AF) 
10  Miihkinen (2012) The International Journal of Accounting (IJOA) 
11  Barakat and Hussainey (2013) International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) 
12  Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2013) International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) 
13  Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) 
14 Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2015) The British Accounting Review (BAR) 
15 Malafronte, Porzio, and Starita (2016) International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) 
16 Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016) Corporate Governance: An International Review (CGIR) 
Panel B: papers on informativeness of risk reporting, presented in chronological order (12 papers discussed in Section 3, categorized in Section 5,  
and summarized in Table 4) 
N Paper Journal 
17 Rajgopal (1999) The Accounting Review (TAR) 
18 Roulstone (1999) Accounting Horizons (AH) 
19 Hodder and McAnally (2001) Financial Analysts Journal (FAJ) 
20 Jorion (2002) The Accounting Review (TAR) 
21 Linsley and Lawrence (2007) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal (AAAJ) 
22 Akhigbe and Martin (2008) Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) 
23 Pérignon and Smith (2010) Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) 
24 Kravet and Muslu (2013) Review of Accounting Studies (RAST) 
25 Abraham and Shrives (2014) The British Accounting Review (BAR) 
26 Bao and Datta (2014) Management Science (MS) 
27 Elbannan and Elbannan (2015) Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance (JAAF) 
28 Filzen  (2015) Accounting Horizons (AH) 
Panel C: papers on both, presented in chronological order (4 papers discussed in Section 4, categorized in Section 5, and summarized in Table 6) 
N Paper Journal 
29 Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014) Review of Accounting Studies (RAST) 
30 Elshandidy and Neri (2015) Corporate Governance: An International Review (CGIR) 
31 Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) The International Journal of Accounting (IJOA) 
32 Hope, Hu, and Lu (2016) Review of Accounting Studies (RAST) 
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Table 2   
Summary of empirical papers, presented in chronological order, on risk reporting incentives 
Study name 
(year) 
Journal Jurisdiction Sample Content analysis 
(code unit) 
Findings Theoretical 
underpinnings 
Limitations and/or related suggestions 
Solomon 
(1999) 
 
 
BAR UK Questionnaire of 
40 UK institutional 
investors in 1996 
Not applicable  The findings document an increasing awareness of foreign exchange risk management and 
indicate that UK investment institutions actively managed foreign exchange risk within their 
investment portfolios. The paper also reports that institutional investors require their investee 
companies to disclose information relating to their foreign exchange risk management policies. 
 
Not specified  (1) Further research is needed to explore 
investors’ risk disclosure requirements. 
Solomon et 
al. (2000) 
BAR UK Questionnaire of 
97 UK institutional 
investors in 1999 
Not applicable The findings indicate that institutional investors do not generally favor a regulated 
environment for corporate risk disclosure or a general statement of business risk. The 
respondents agree that increased risk disclosure would assist them in their portfolio investment 
decisions.  
 
Modern 
portfolio and  
regulatory 
theories  
(1) Further in-depth case-study research 
may indicate more of the dynamic nature 
of the risk disclosure issue.  
 
Beretta and 
Bozzolan 
(2004) 
 
 
 
IJOA Italy  Non-financial 
firms listed on the 
Italian (ordinary) 
market in 2001 
 
Manual content 
analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
 
The results suggest that quantity of risk disclosure is mainly driven by firms’ size rather than 
industry type. Specifically, the results confirm that relative quantity, density, and outlook are 
not statistically influenced by the size or the industry, but that the latter two do seem to have a 
significant impact on depth (where depth is defined by two properties: (i) the sign of the 
economic impact of the risk-related disclosure; and (ii) the measures used to communicate the 
expected performance). 
 
The costs and 
benefits of 
voluntary risk 
disclosure 
(1) Further research is needed to examine 
the relevance of each dimension of the 
quality of risk information. 
(2) Future research might investigate the 
impact of the quality of risk disclosure on 
the cost of capital. 
Linsley and 
Shrives 
(2006) 
BAR UK 79 FTSE 100 non-
financial firms in 
2000 
Manual content 
analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
 
A significant association is found between risk disclosures and company size and the level of 
environmental risk. They argue that a lack of coherence in the risk narratives implies that a risk 
information gap existed and consequently stakeholders are unable to adequately assess the risk 
profile of a company. 
 
Attribution 
theory  
(1) Adopting multi-disciplinary 
approaches as insights drawn from areas 
such as sociology may present alternative 
methodological approaches to assist 
future risk disclosure research. 
Abraham 
and Cox 
(2007) 
BAR UK 71 FTSE 100 non-
financial firms in 
2002 
Manual content 
analysis  
(number of 
words and 
number of 
sentences) 
They find that corporate risk reporting is negatively related to share ownership by long-term 
institutions (in this case, defined as pension funds; vis-à-vis life assurance funds which are 
classified as short-term institutions), and thus the results imply that this important class of 
institutional investor has investment preferences for firms with a lower level of risk disclosure. 
Concerning governance, they find that both the number of executive and the number of 
independent directors positively related to the level of corporate risk reporting, but not the 
number of dependent non-executive directors.  
 
Agency theory  (1) Future work on risk reporting should 
consider that, if a firm decides to dilute its 
risk-related discussion very thinly within a 
mass of text, it may be too piecemeal to 
pass for risk-related information at the 
sentence level of analysis (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004). 
Marshall 
and 
Weetman 
(2007) 
JBFA UK and 
USA 
80 non-financial 
(40 UK-based, 40 
US-based) firms as 
at 1998/99 
Constructed 
index for risk 
disclosure  
They find that the information asymmetry gap is lower in the US, where risk reporting is more 
relevant and where firms have higher levels of financial risk. In contrast, the UK evidence 
suggests that the information gap is lowest when gearing or liquidity is higher.  
Agency theory  (1) Limited sample size.  
(2) Incomplete disclosure due to the 
relatively early adoption of regulations. 
Deumes 
and  
Knechel 
(2008) 
AJPT Netherlands  192 non-financial 
listed firms from 
1997 to 1999  
 
Constructed 
index for 
internal risk 
disclosure 
They find that economic incentives for voluntary internal control reporting exist in a low-
regulation environment. The paper finds evidence that the economic incentives for voluntary 
internal control reporting exists primarily in a low-regulation context. The paper also finds a 
negative relationship between the extent of internal control disclosure and blockholder 
ownership, and a positive relationship between the extent of risk disclosure and financial 
leverage. 
 
Agency theory 
 
 
 
(1) Subjectivity of risk disclosure index. 
 
Hill and 
Short (2009) 
AF UK 420 IPO listed 
firms from 1991 to 
2003 
 
Risk disclosure 
index 
(existence of 
item(s))  
The results suggest that firms tend to reveal a high (low) proportion of forward-looking 
information (risk management disclosure). The results document that managerial ownership is 
negatively associated with risk disclosure.  
  
Not specified (1) Further empirical work is needed to 
investigate whether risk information is a 
costly or less effective means to reduce 
information asymmetry.  
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Taylor et al.  
(2010) 
AF Australia Sample of 
111 listed 
resource 
firms from 2002 to 
2006 
Risk disclosure 
indices 
(existence of 
item(s))  
The results suggest that corporate governance strength, the need to raise capital, and being 
locally listed influence Australian firms’ decision to reveal a high level of financial risk 
management information, both mandatorily and voluntarily. The paper also documents a 
significant impact of IFRS adoption on the revealing of that information. The paper finds that 
larger and highly leveraged firms tend to provide more risk information than others.  
 
Agency theory (1) Examining the impact of individual 
corporate governance attributes is 
important to understanding firms’ 
behavior regarding their financial risk 
management disclosure policies.  
Miihkinen 
(2012) 
IJOA Finland  99 non-financial 
firms listed on the 
OMX Helsinki 
between 2005 and 
2007 
Manual content 
analysis (number 
of words and 
sentences) 
The paper finds an increase in the quantity of risk disclosure, with more extensive and more 
comprehensive information following the release of a new Finnish risk reporting standard. 
The paper also finds larger firms that are cross-listed in the US tend to provide more 
quantitative risk disclosure and observes that the quality has increased over the years. 
 
Signaling, 
proprietary cost 
and agency 
theories 
(1) Further research is needed to test the 
economic consequences of risk 
information from equity and debt 
investors' perspectives. 
Barakat and 
Hussainey 
(2013) 
IRFA Europe  85 banks from 20 
EU member 
countries over 
three years (2008, 
2009, and 2010) 
A self-
constructed 
disclosure index 
to measure the 
quality of ORD  
This paper finds evidence of a significant impact of corporate governance (CG) on the quality 
of operational risk reporting (ORD). The study also finds bank supervision an essential factor 
facilitating that impact.  
 
Legitimacy, 
resource 
dependence, and 
stakeholder 
theories 
(1) Further research is needed to examine 
the impact of the audit committee in 
enhancing the quality of risk reporting.  
(2) The impact of operational risk 
reporting quality on banks’ cost of capital 
is still an open question.  
 
Elshandidy 
et al. (2013) 
IRFA UK 1216 firm-year 
observations for 
FTSE all-share 
non-financial firms 
from 2005 to 2008 
Automated 
textual analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
The paper finds that firms characterized by higher levels of systematic risk, financing risk and 
risk-adjusted returns, and those with lower levels of stock return variability, exhibit higher 
levels of aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure. They also find mandatory risk disclosure to 
be influenced positively by firm size, dividend yield, and board independence, and negatively 
by high leverage.  
Regulatory, 
agency, and 
signaling 
theories 
 
(1) Further research is required to 
observe, and if any why, the differences in 
risk incentives across countries.  
(2) Examine whether users would value 
external assurance over risk disclosures 
made in annual report narratives. 
Ntim et al. 
(2013) 
 
 
 
 
IRFA South Africa  
 
 
 
50 firms from 
2002 to 2011  
Manual content 
analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
The paper finds that corporate risk disclosure is negatively related to block ownership and 
institutional ownership, and positively related to board diversity, board size, and independent 
non-executive directors.  
Institutional, 
legitimacy, 
stakeholder, and 
agency theories 
(1) Applying a multi-theoretical 
framework within a cross-country context 
needs further attention from extant work 
on risk reporting.  
 
Elshandidy 
et al. (2015) 
BAR Germany, 
UK, and 
USA 
3685 firm-year 
observations for 
Frankfurt 
(CDAX), FTSE, 
and NASDAQ all-
share non-financial 
firms from 2005 to 
2010 
Automated 
textual analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
 
The results document that mandatory and voluntary risk reporting (MRR and VRR) are 
influenced by systematic risk, the legal system, and cultural values. They also find that country 
and firm characteristics have higher explanatory power over the observed variations in MRR 
than over those in VRR. They find that the legal system and cultural values have high 
explanatory power over MRR variations over time, even under the new approach of 
international convergence. They are less successful, however, in explaining the variations in 
VRR between firms across countries. 
Institutional 
theory  
(1) Future work on comparative risk 
reporting might increase the number of 
countries so as to account for a wide 
range of country-specific factors.  
(2) Further research on comparative 
quality of mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure is needed. 
Malafronte 
et al. (2015) 
IRFA Europe  231 firm-year 
observations from   
2005 to 2010 
Automated 
textual analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
The results show that the amount of risk information provided in the annual report is 
significantly affected by insurers’ characteristics such as size and technical provision (i.e. the 
main item in the balance sheet of an insurer; a high level of technical provision represents a 
signal of the strength of an insurance company), and country-level characteristics. The paper 
also finds that the amount of risk disclosure is affected by the financial crisis as firms are likely 
to provide more risk information to assure shareholders of the board’s independence from the 
global crisis. To this end, they find that most companies in their sample use their risk 
disclosure to talk about the financial crisis, as opposed to ignore it, and to explain how they are 
– or how they enacted strategies to make themselves – independent from it 
 
Not specified (1) Future work might include comparing 
the European insurance industry with 
those of other Western countries and 
emerging countries. 
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Al-Hadi et 
al.  
(2016) 
 
CGIR Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council 
(GCC) 
677 firm-year 
observations of 
financial firms 
from 2007 to 2011 
Risk disclosure 
indices 
(existence of 
item(s)) 
This paper finds that firms with a separate risk committee are likely to exhibit more market 
risk disclosure than other firms. These firms’ decision to provide risk information is also 
influenced by risk committee characteristics including size and qualification. Results are more 
pronounced for mature-stage firms.  
Agency theory, 
legitimacy 
theory, and the 
resource-based 
theory 
Future work might include: 
(1) Examining the impact of institutional 
factors on firms’ decision to reveal risk 
information. 
(2) Observing the effect of market risk 
disclosure on information asymmetry. 
 
 
 
Table 3  
Areas of divergence for papers on incentives for risk reporting, presented in chronological order (16 papers summarized in Table 2, discussed in Section 2, and categorized in Section 5) 
N Main classification   
 
Method and context 
Type of disclosure  Type of content analysis  Type of analysis Type of sector 
Mandatory Voluntary Aggregate Manual  Automated Within-country Cross-country Non-financial  Financial/insurance  
1  Solomon (1999)    Not applicable   Not applicable 
2  Solomon et al. (2000)    Not applicable   Not applicable 
3  Beretta and Bozzolan (2004)          
4  Linsley and Shrives (2006)          
5  Abraham and Cox (2007)          
6  Marshall and Weetman (2007)          
7  Deumes and Knechel (2008)          
8 Hill and Short (2009)           
9 Taylor et al. (2010)          
10  Miihkinen (2012)          
11  Barakat and Hussainey (2013)          
12  Elshandidy et al. (2013)          
13  Ntim et al. (2013)          
14 Elshandidy et al. (2015)          
15 Malafronte et al. (2016)          
16 Al-Hadi et al. (2016)          
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Table 4  
Summary of empirical papers on risk-reporting informativeness, presented in chronological order 
Study name 
(year) 
Journal Jurisdiction Sample Content analysis 
(code unit) 
Findings Theoretical 
underpinnings 
Limitations and/or related suggestions 
Rajgopal 
(1999) 
 
 
TAR USA 149 oil and gas 
firm-years 
from 1993 to 
1996 
 
 
Manual content 
analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
The paper finds that both disclosure formats (tabular and sensitivity) are informative (i.e., 
equity price sensitive to a change in oil and gas prices). These findings suggest that these 
FRR No.48 disclosures are useful for investors wanting to assess commodity contracts and 
prices in specific circumstances (e.g., oil and gas firms). However, the risk-relevance of 
market risk disclosures related to more complex forms of risk and in broader contexts is 
weak and inconsistent. 
Neo-classical 
economic theory 
 (1) Research is needed to investigate how 
investors interpret the results of risk 
management activities which are presented 
under different formats of risk disclosure (i.e. 
sensitivity analysis, tabular, Value at Risk).  
 
Roulstone 
(1999) 
AH USA 25 non-
financial firms 
from  
1996 to 1997 
Manual content 
analysis  
(number of 
words) 
The paper finds that the majority of the sampled firms report derivative use. The majority of 
registrants provide quantitative and qualitative disclosures of market risk; however, only 
around half of these firms discuss the details and limitations of their risk measurement 
models and disclosures. Overall, while registrants have greatly increased their disclosures 
about market risk, there is room for improvement in future filings. 
Not specified  (1) Further research is needed on whether 
firms will change their focus due to the change 
in regulations (i.e., FAS No.133). 
 
Hodder and 
McAnally 
(2001) 
FAJ USA 4 financial 
firms’ 10-K 
disclosures in 
1999 
Manually 
reviewed 10-K 
disclosures 
(sentences) 
 
The paper proposes a methodology for comparing the tabular format to the VaR format for 
FRR No. 48 disclosures. It finds that the tabular format provides useful information about 
firms’ market risk (subject to limitations). 
 
Not specified  
 
(1) Does not directly measure the 
informativeness of the information required 
by FRR No.48. 
Jorion 
(2002) 
TAR USA Eight banks 
from 1995 to 
1999 
Manual  
(number of 
sentences) 
The paper finds that VaR disclosures are informative since they enable investors to predict 
variability in trading revenues and make adequate comparisons of trading portfolios. 
Not specified (1) Methodology affects the observed quality 
of VaR disclosures. 
(2) Does not quantify the information revealed 
in VaR disclosures.  
Linsley and 
Lawrence 
(2007) 
AAAJ 
 
 
UK 25 FTSE 100 
non-financial 
in 2001 
Manual content 
analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
The paper finds the readability of the risk disclosures to be poor or very poor. However, no 
evidence is found to suggest that directors are deliberately obfuscating or concealing bad risk 
news through their writing style. 
 
Not specified (1) The principal formula for readability only 
considers writing style, ignoring content, 
organization, and format, all of which can also 
affect reader understanding.  
 
Akhigbe 
and Martin 
(2008) 
JBF USA Sample of 392 
banks as at the 
end of 2001 
Manual content 
analysis (number 
of pages) 
 
The paper studies changes in risk measures after the passage of Sarbanes Oxley. These are 
divided into shorter-term and longer-term measures of risk. They find that the former shift 
positively on average, whereas the latter shift negatively on average. They suggest that the 
positive shift in shorter-term measures of risk is consistent with the mandation of risk 
disclosure and corporate governance. They suggest that the negative shift in longer-term 
measures of risk is consistent with an improvement in transparency and a corresponding 
reduction in investor uncertainty.   
    
Agency theory (1) Explore the validity, costs and benefits of 
the assumptions made about higher (lower) 
levels of disclosure transparency vis-à-vis 
increases (reductions) in investor uncertainty. 
Pérignon 
and Smith 
(2010) 
JBF USA The largest 10 
US banks from 
1996 to 2005. 
A self-constructed 
disclosure index 
to measure the 
VaR disclosure 
The paper studies levels of VaR disclosure (measured by an index) and the accuracy of such 
disclosure (measured by number of VaR exceedances and whether VaR disclosure is 
associated with volatility of subsequent trading revenues). They find an upward trend in the 
quantity of VaR disclosure and that historical simulation is by far the most common method 
in calculating VaR. They also find that VaR disclosure is less informative as it does not 
impact future volatility.  
 
Not specified (1) Limited sample size which might question 
the generalization of the paper findings  
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Kravet and 
Muslu 
(2013) 
RAST USA 28,110 firm-
year 
observations 
from 1994 to 
2007 
Automated textual 
analysis (number 
of sentences)  
The paper finds that annual increases in risk disclosure were associated with increased stock 
return volatility and trading volumes around and after the filings, and with more dispersed 
forecast revisions around the filings. It also finds the results are less pronounced for firm-
level disclosures that deviate from those of other companies in the same industry and year.  
Not specified  (1) Further research is needed to explore the 
usefulness of risk information in the debt 
market. 
Abraham 
and Shrives  
(2014) 
BAR UK Four food 
producer firms 
from the FTSE 
100 from 2002 
to 2007 
Manual content 
analysis 
(number of 
sentences) 
 
Results suggest that company managers prefer providing symbolic than substantive 
disclosure. In suggesting a way forward, the authors emphasize the role that stakeholders, 
including managers, users, regulators, and auditors, could play in improving the quality of 
risk reporting.  
Institutional and 
proprietary costs 
theories 
(1) Applying the suggested framework to more 
companies.  
(2) More field work needed, utilizing case 
studies. 
 
Bao and 
Datta 
(2014) 
MS USA 7679 firm-year 
observations 
2006-2010 
 
Automated textual 
analysis  
(number of 
words) 
The authors find that around two-thirds of the types of risk disclosure lack informativeness 
and have no significant influence on investors’ perception of risk. Moreover, they find that 
the informative risk types do not necessarily increase investors’ perception of risk. 
Not specified (1) Further research is required to examine 
how some risks might be correlated to each 
other and the possibilities of merging them. 
 
Elbannan 
and 
Elbannan 
(2015) 
JAAF Egypt 
 
 
 
 
283 firm-year 
observations 
2002-2011  
of financial 
firms 
Risk disclosure 
indices (existence 
of item(s)) 
They find that risk disclosure significantly influences Egyptian banks’ performance and 
evaluation. The observed effects are weaker during than prior to the period of financial 
crisis. In emerging markets, such as Egypt, the regulatory supervision might not be sufficient 
to ensure that information provided by banks is incorporated into stock prices.  
 
Not specified (1) Examining the impact of regulations and 
the level of supervision of Egyptian banks on 
performance and valuation is still an open 
question.  
Filzen 
(2015)  
AH USA 13,165 firm-
year 
observations 
from 2006 to 
2010 
Automated textual 
analysis  
(the presence of a 
risk factor update) 
This paper examines the impact of risk factor updates in quarterly reports (10-Q) on negative 
abnormal returns. It finds firms that update their risk disclosures in these reports to have 
significantly lower future earnings, more extreme negative future earnings, and lower 
abnormal returns around the filing dates of the 10-Q.   
Not specified (1) Future research might examine whether 
there is any association between risk factor 
disclosures and positive abnormal returns. 
 
Table 5  
Areas of divergence for papers on informativeness of risk reporting, presented in chronological order (12 papers summarized in Table 4, discussed in Section 3, and categorized in Section 5) 
N Main classification  Method and context 
Type of disclosure   Type of content analysis  Type of analysis Type of sector 
Mandatory Voluntary Aggregate Manual  Automated Within-country Cross-country Non-financial  Financial/insurance  
17 Rajgopal (1999)    Not applicable     
18 Roulstone (1999)          
19 Hodder and McAnally (2001)          
20 Jorion (2002)          
21 Linsley and Lawrence (2007)           
22 Akhigbe and Martin (2008)          
23 Pérignon and Smith (2010)          
24 Kravet and Muslu (2013)          
25 Abraham and Shrives (2014)          
26 Bao and Datta (2014)          
27 Elbannan and Elbannan (2015)          
28 Filzen (2015)          
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Table 6  
Summary of empirical papers on risk reporting incentives and informativeness, presented in chronological order 
Study name 
(year) 
Journal Jurisdiction Sample Content 
analysis 
(code unit) 
Findings Theoretical 
underpinnings 
Limitations and/or related suggestions 
Campbell et al. 
(2014) 
 
RAST 
 
USA 9076 firm-
year 
observations 
from 2005 to 
2008 
 
Automated 
textual 
analysis 
(number of 
words) 
Disclosed risk information has a significant association with market value and risk levels, and 
the authors conclude that risk information is firm-specific and useful to investors. They also 
find that textual risk disclosure in Section 1A (Risk Factors) of form 10-K is significantly 
associated with risk levels, and that the information conveyed in risk factor disclosures is 
reflected in systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, information asymmetry, and firm value. 
Not specified  
 
(1) Further research is needed to measure 
the impact of risk disclosure on the 
increased probability of bankruptcy and 
credit default. 
 
Elshandidy and 
Neri (2015) 
CGIR UK and 
Italy 
Non-
financial 
firms  
June 2005 to 
June 2010 
 
Automated 
textual 
analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
The paper finds that governance factors are associated with decisions of UK (Italian) firms 
over whether to exhibit risk information voluntarily (mandatorily) in their annual report 
narratives. Furthermore, strongly governed firms in the UK tend to provide more meaningful 
risk information (observed through market liquidity) to their investors than weakly governed 
firms. In Italy, however, they find strongly governed firms risk information voluntarily, which 
significantly improves market liquidity. 
Agency theory  (1) Examining the quality rather than the 
quantity of risk. 
(2) Scrutinizing other corporate 
communication outlets (e.g., Li, 2010), such 
as online resources, conference calls, 
and/or financial analysts’ reports.  
Elshandidy and 
Shrives 
(2016) 
IJOA Germany Non-
financial 
firms from 
2005 to 2009 
Automated 
textual 
analysis  
(number of 
sentences) 
They find that the decision to provide or withhold risk information is more significantly 
associated with the underlying risk of a firm (i.e., market beta) than other environmental 
incentives (i.e., ownership structure, capital structure, external equity finance, and borrowing). 
The size and length of firms’ annual reports are the dominant factors that explain (German) 
firms’ provision of risk information. Also, the German market tends to positively (negatively) 
price good (bad) news about risk either by improving (worsening) market liquidity by 
removing (creating) information asymmetries, or by reducing (increasing) investor-perceived 
risk. 
Agency theory, 
economic theory 
(1) Investor-perceived risk can be measured 
directly through questionnaires rather than 
by relying on an indirect measure (i.e., 
volatility of stock returns).  
Hope et al. 
(2016) 
RAST USA 14,865 firm-
year 
observations 
from 2006 to 
2011 
Automated 
textual 
analysis  
(number of 
words) 
 
They find significant evidence that more specific risk factors enable analysts to better assess 
firms’ fundamental risk analysis. Their results suggest that risk factor disclosure is not 
boilerplate as some prior research has suggested (Kravet & Muslu, 2013).  
 
Proprietary costs 
theory 
(1) Results are based on a relatively small 
hand-collected sample of firms covered by 
the analysts from one financial institution. 
Table 7  
Areas of divergence papers on risk reporting incentives and informativeness (four papers summarized in Table 6, discussed in Section 4, and categorized in Section 5) 
N Main classification  Method and context 
Type of disclosure  Type of content analysis  Type of analysis Type of sector 
Mandatory Voluntary Aggregate Manual  Automated Within-country Cross-country Non-financial  Financial/insurance  
29 Campbell et al. (2014)          
30 Elshandidy and Neri (2015)          
31 Elshandidy and Shrives (2016)          
32 Hope et al. (2016)          
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Fig.1. Criteria for selection of reviewed papers, main themes, and areas of divergence 
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Areas of  divergence 
Discussed in Section 5 
 
Mandatory  Manual  Within-country 
 
Cross-country Non-financial 
 
Financial 
Incentives (16 papers) 
Discussed in Section 2 
  
Informativeness (12 papers) 
Discussed in Section 3 
 
Type of  disclosure 
Aggregate 
Voluntary  
Type of  sector  
Concerns risk reporting 
Type of  analysis Type of  content analysis  
Automated  
Published in a ranked journal 3*(A) or 4*(A*) 
 
Criteria for selection  
 
Reviewed papers (32 papers as detailed in Table 1) 
Method and context 
 
Main themes 
 
Published after 1997 
Incentives and informativeness (4 papers) 
Discussed in Section 4 
 
Other papers (11 papers are summarized and categorized 
in Appendix 1) 
Appendix 1 
Summary of other empirical risk reporting papers, presented in chronological order, that have been mentioned in our discussion in Section 5 rather than in the main review as they do not comply with the criteria mentioned in Section 1 
Panel A: papers on risk reporting incentives 
Study name 
(year) 
Jurisdiction Sample Findings Areas of divergence 
Method and context 
Type of disclosure  Type of content analysis  Type of analysis Type of sector  
Mandatory  Voluntary Aggregate  Manual  Automated Within- 
Country  
Cross-
country 
Non-
financial  
Financial/ 
insurance  
Lajili and  
Zéghal 
(2005) 
Canada 300 firms 
from the year 
1999 
This paper finds firms provide a high degree of mandatory and voluntary 
risk information. After analytically reviewing such information, the paper 
concludes that most of this information tends to lack uniformity, clarity, 
and quantification, suggesting a limited role for such disclosure. The 
paper concludes that more reforms are required to improve the quality of 
risk information, which could reduce information asymmetry.  
 
         
Hassan 
(2009) 
United Arab 
Emirates  
(UAE) 
41 firms from 
the year 2005 
 
 
This paper finds that leverage and industry type significantly influence 
risk disclosure by UAE firms. 
         
Dobler et al. 
(2011) 
Canada, 
Germany, 
UK, and  USA 
160 firm-year 
observations 
from the year 
2005 
 
This paper finds that firms do not reveal quantitative and forward-
looking attributes related to risk disclosure, but qualitative and 
retrospective information. Observed variations in the quantity of risk 
disclosure are partially associated with domestic regulation, playing an 
important role in firm incentives. The impacts of risk factors vary by 
country, as US and Canadian firms’ risk disclosures are positively 
associated with their risk levels, German firms’ negatively, and UK firms’ 
not significantly related at all. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Oliveira et 
al. (2011) 
Portugal 81 non-
financial firms 
from the year 
2005 
This paper finds a non-significant impact of regulations on risk-reporting 
practices. Risk disclosure practices are likely to be categorized as generic, 
qualitative, and backward-looking. It finds (consistent with the agency 
theory) significant impacts of leverage and the board of directors on risk-
reporting practices.  
 
         
Mokhtar 
and Mellett 
(2013) 
Egypt 105 firms in 
the year 2007 
Consistent with proprietary cost theory, this paper finds firms operating 
in highly competitive areas (measured by barriers to entry) to be likely to 
exhibit high levels of voluntary risk information. The results reveal that 
firms with larger boards, audited by one of the big 4, and with separate 
leadership are likely to comply with risk regulations. The paper does not 
observe a statistical impact in relation to sector type, firm size, liquidity, 
or risk-reporting practices. Generally, the results suggest the direction of 
association between the main independent variables and mandatory risk 
disclosure is different from observed trends for voluntary risk disclosure.  
         
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Abdallah  
et al. (2015) 
The Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council  
(GCC) 
countries 
424 firm-year 
observations 
for  
financial firms 
in  the year 
2008  
This paper finds different patterns in how corporate governance affects 
risk disclosure practices, between Islamic and conventional financial 
firms. The study finds that risk disclosure varies between GCC countries, 
despite sociocultural and regulatory similarities. 
 
         
Buckby et 
al. (2015) 
Australia  
 
 
 
300 firm-year 
observations 
for the year 
2010 
 
 
 
This paper documents that risk disclosure does not appear to be 
impacted by board characteristics. It does not find a significant impact, 
either, for risk levels, big 4, or audit committee independence, on risk 
disclosure practice. It finds the presence of a risk committee to be a 
significant factor explaining significant differences between firms’ 
disclosure of risk information.  
         
Martikainen 
et al. (2015) 
Finland 59 to 85 firm-
year 
observations 
for 2006-2009 
This paper highlights two slightly new aspects of board characteristics in 
their relation to (dis)incentivising managers’ revealing of high (quantity 
and quality) risk information. These are boards’ financial incentives and 
competence. Directors’ financial incentives (proxied by their wealth and 
compensation) and their competence (experience and education) are 
found to be empirically significant in relation to risk disclosure. The 
paper also finds that variations in the quality of risk reporting are 
significantly explained by board characteristics.  
  
 
 
 
 
       
Panel B: Papers on risk reporting informativeness 
Study name 
(year) 
Jurisdiction Sample Findings Areas of divergence 
Method and context 
Type of disclosure  Type of content analysis  Type of analysis Type of sector  
Mandatory  Voluntary Aggregate  Manual  Automated Within- 
Country  
Cross-
country 
Non-
financial  
Financial/ 
insurance  
 
Miihkinen 
(2013) 
Finland 386 firm-year 
observations  
2006-2009 
This paper finds that the quality of mandatory risk disclosure significantly 
mitigates information asymmetry between managers and investors, 
suggesting that this information is firm-specific. The paper also finds that 
small, high-tech and low-analyst-coverage firms are likely to provide 
significantly more informative risk information than other firms.  
         
Abdullah  
et al. (2015) 
Malaysia  395 firms 
from the year 
2011 
This paper finds voluntary risk management disclosure improves firms’ 
value. This is particularly true for beneficial as opposed to damaging 
voluntary risk management disclosures.  
         
Moumen  
et al. (2015) 
12 Middle 
Eastern and 
North African 
(MENA)  
countries 
809 firm-year 
observations 
for non-
financial firms 
during 2007–
2009 
This paper finds voluntary risk disclosure significantly influenced by 
future earnings. The observed impact is moderated by the level of 
proprietary costs. 
         
